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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the International 
Hellenic University.  
This dissertation is an economic analysis of the financial assets of leading football clubs in the 
Europe based on Financial Fair Play, it explains the financial behavior of these clubs under the 
specific and institutionalized UEFA’s rule, using data from the balance sheets, articles, official 
websites, books, newspapers related on the financial data of the teams.  
I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Pr. Spyros 
Leventis who inspired me and helped me, not only working on this topic but whatever I needed 
during the courses. Besides my supervisor I would like to thank my family for supporting me in 
every new step I make all these years. Finally, I would like to thank the other professors and the 
staff of the university for the excellent cooperation we had during my studies there. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As it is well known, football is now an integral part of the business world. Huge amounts are 
invested each year, in the context of the competition of companies active in the sector. The goal 
is, of course, to bring the club-company to the top of this category of business. This is achieved 
by the spending of funds in player transfers, which leads to the acquisition of domestic and 
international championships or other important successes, to the improvement of the team's 
reputation and to the ultimate goal of attracting as many fans as possible, who are at the same 
time the consumers of this sector through the purchase of tickets, jerseys and other clothing 
even in many cases of stocks. 
The UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations were introduced by Financial Control Panel of football’s 
governing body in Europe to prevent football teams from unnecessary wastage and consequently 
to protect them from the long-term threats for their survival that may result from these 
wastages. These regulations provide penalties for any football team that exceeds its costs over a 
specific time period. The worst punishment for a football team may be the disqualification from 
European competitions for a certain time period. Other penalties may include fines, a ban on 
transfers for a time period and the withholding prize money. 
The five main axes: 
1. Clean money, open books: With the obligation to provide a detailed statement of 
revenue and expenditure, to justify their expenses from the income of each financial 
year and to present the next year's analytical bundle in order to certify their solvency as 
companies, the European football clubs should be "clean" at 100% in order to be eligible 
to participate in UEFA competitions. 
2.  Healthy Prospective Investors "We cannot talk about healthy competition in our 
competitions when some teams spend uncontrolled over those ones that do the right: 
With financial fair play, UEFA aspires to disappear the pay-per-view investors from 
European football in the long run. This is because every year they will have to cover the 
damage they caused in the previous season (if they are up to 45 million for the first 
three years or 30 for the next), while the new regulation favors the investment costs for 
stadiums, training center and Academies. The prospect is to push those who want to 
invest money in their team in infrastructure that will belong to the club independently 
of the owner. 
3. Financial rationalization: The new regulation will reduce both the cost of transfers and 
the cost of contracts of the players. The most reasonable mathematical formula says 
that it is not possible for a club to have a financial balance when wage and contract 
costs far exceed 50% of its income. 
4. Healthy competition on a fair basis: "End of the credit successes" was Michel Platini's 
motto when he first introduced the idea of the new regulation. Plan and Strategy will 
return, when the teams learn to spend as much as they earn. 
5. Better organization and planning: The teams will be required to inform UEFA online of 
their financial statements throughout an economic season, so they will be forced to put 
in order the chaos of most of the European clubs' accounts. 
 
 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS’ CHRONICLE 
 
At the beginning of the new millennium, it became clear that while European football was 
profiting from horribly higher revenues, these revenues did not concern the profitability of the 
clubs. Instead, these revenues were largely spent on struggling to gain talent players. This 
struggle also led to an enormous increase in the wages of the elite players, which has led to the 
concern that tournaments across Europe will become a struggle amongst the owners with the 
largest financial resources and will therefore undermine the integrity of the games.  
Simultaneously, many clubs started to make critical losses that could be sustained via subsidies 
from private investors or public bodies. It also led to the bankruptcy of the clubs and many 
creditors were leave unpaid. In order to be faced this condition, the European football governing 
body, UEFA (Union of European Football Federations), introduced FFPRs to ensure the long-term 
finances of European football teams. UEFA, is a union of associations, 54 federations across 
Europe are under UEFA’s protection and it is essentially the link between them. The aim was to 
ensure the long-term economic situation of European football.  
The executive committee of UEFA unanimously adopted the idea of financial fair play for the 
welfare of the game in September 2009 and received huge support from the whole football 
community as well. The main objectives of the FFP are: 
• To introduce more rationality and discipline into the football club's finances 
• To reduce pressure on transfer fees and salaries and limit the impact of the inflation 
• Competition among the clubs within their own revenues 
• To urge long-term investments in infrastructure and the field of the youth players 
• Protection of the viability of the European football  
• To secure the settlement of the club’s liabilities on a timely basis 
These objectives reflect the point of view that UEFA has to examine the systemic environment of 
football in Europe where individual clubs compete, in particular the broader inflationary impact 
of wages and transportation costs. 
Nowadays, many teams have reported worsening, and repeated, financial losses. The wider 
financial situation has created hard market conditions for European clubs, and this can have a 
negative consequence on revenue generation and creates extra challenges for clubs concerning 
the availability of day-to-day and financing operations. Many teams have experienced liquidity 
scarcities, leading for example to delayed payments to employees, other clubs and social/tax 
authorities. 
Therefore, the FFPR (Financial Fair Play Rules) were introduced by UEFA in an effort to realize 
these targets. The rules contain an obligation for the football clubs having balanced books by 
passing the test of FFPR, known as “break even”. According to regulations of FFPR, clubs cannot 
spend more than their turnover, as all clubs have to ensure that all their expenses and liabilities 
are covered on a timetable basis. 
The FFP measurements comprehend a multi-year valuation, allowing for a longer-term 
perspective and within the broader framework of the European football club. They arrive across 
the existing criteria of the UEFA club licensing system that are primarily planned to enable a 
valuation of a club's economic situation in the short term, and are initially managed by the 
governing bodies in each national association of UEFA.  
The Executive Committee of UEFA confirmed the constitution of the two-chamber CFCB (Club 
Financial Control Body) in June 2012 to supervise the application of the regulations of FFP. The 
CFCB substituted the CFCP (Club Financial Control Panel), which had supervised clubs since the 
first institutionalization of the regulations in May 2010, with the main development being that 
the Club Financial Control Body is an organ of UEFA for the justice administration. It is also 
competent to enforce disciplinary meters in the case of non-fulfilment of the demands, and to 
decide on cases concerning the eligibility of clubs for UEFA club competitions.  
The UEFA FFPRs, which were confirmed in May 2010 after an extensive deliberation period and 
updated in the 2012 edition, are being performed over a three-year period, with teams 
participating in UEFA club leagues having their employee and transfer payables supervised since 
the summer of 2011, and the assessment of break-even covering the financial years ending 2012 
and 2013 to be valued during 2013/14. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 How is the FFP break even defined? 
UEFA's goal is for the clubs to achieve a two-year / three-year turnover in which they cover all 
their expenses at a large point. Break even in accounting does not allow either profit or damage, 
but the FFP is a more flexible term. A club may not achieve a break even, however, normally pass 
the FFP test without penalty. 
 
 
 
 
                       Table: The deviations allowed by UEFA without sanctions 
 
Control 
Period 
Season 
Number 
Examined Seasons Permissible deviation 
S-2 S-1 S Opening 
via Funds 
Opening 
without 
Funds 
13-14 2 - 11-12 12-13 45m euro 5m euro 
14-15 3 11-12 12-13 13-14 45m euro 5m euro 
15-16 3 12-13 13-14 14-15 30m euro 5m euro 
16-17 3 13-14 14-15 15-16 30m euro 5m euro 
17-18 3 14-15 15-16 16-17 30m euro 5m euro 
18-19 3 15-16 16-17 17-18 <30m euro 5m euro 
 
 
 
 
2.2 What are the loss limits? 
Under the provisions of the FFP, there are 2 different limits that must apply to clubs that do not 
achieve break even (or profitability) in each audit period (from this year to 3 years, but last year 
they are considered for 2 years). 
The first is the loss of € 5,000,000, i.e. when the relevant expenses, the costs considered and 
accepted by UEFA, are up to € 5,000,000 more than the receipts it examines and accepts in a 
control period (cumulatively for 3 years and not € 5,000 for each year). In this case, the club is 
not punished. 
The second threshold is 45,000,000 euros for last year and this year or 30,000,000 euros that will 
be the new limit from summer time to 2017-2018 when it will fall further. An opening of a club 
of up to 3 years up to 45,000,000 euros should be covered by the shareholders (eg with a share 
capital increase) up to the amount of 5,000,000 euros (which is the first limit and therefore the 
club passes the FFP test). 
If the club has a three-year loss of more than EUR 45,000,000, then its case will be forwarded by 
the Audit Committee to the Jury of the Chamber of Financial Audit in order to impose the 
prescribed penalties. 
There is only one exception to the open-end rule that covers shareholders above EUR 45,000,000 
and concerns contracts signed before the FFP (before June 30, 2010) under 2 conditions: the 
trend of the loss in the season to be down and exceeding the threshold of € 45,000,000 is due 
only to the specific contracts and only for the 2011-2012 season. If these conditions are met, 
then the club does not take into account the costs of the specific contracts for the 2011-2012 
balance sheet and for any such turnover. 
Example: If a team officially acquired a footballer in early June 2010 and has not made a contract 
adjustment so far, it can deduct from the 3-year turnover that is taken into account for the 2014-
2015 control period (i.e. the cost of the season 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014), the wage 
costs of the 2011-2012 (and only) season, if this is the cause that exceeds the threshold of € 
45,000,000 in the three-year 'opening' and if the damage it presents each year is declining. If the 
club in 2013-2014 has recorded more or less the same costs, or less, from 2012-2013, then it 
cannot exclude the costs of the "old" contracts and be burdened with them. 
 
 
2.3 What revenue and expenses are calculated? 
Income from tickets, promotional rights, sponsorships and advertisements, commercial activities 
and other functions, transcription revenue, and income from internal funding are calculated. No 
revenue from extraterrestrial activities or the potential surplus in sponsorship, which is 
calculated by UEFA. Costs for wages and insurance contributions and employees, transfer costs, 
depreciation costs of one player, financing costs and dividends are calculated. 
After several clubs' reactions to the original plan at the end of the last decade, UEFA made a small 
retreat and exclusion from the expense category for all expenses related to the construction of a 
team's stadium or its academies (e.g. construction, rental of premises, wages, coaches, etc.), i.e. 
expenditures that promote the model of self-sufficiency over time, even if they deprive resources 
of the club at present time. In addition, depreciation on fixed assets or intangible assets other 
than players' cards is not accounted for, excluding tax and expense expenses from extracurricular 
operations. 
 
 
2.4 What about "odd" sponsorships? 
The key point, with regard to the big teams and the heavier area of the rules, which will be used 
by all the clubs in the "red" for their benefit. The basic idea is to prevent artificially inflating an 
association's income through a sponsorship tailored to ... the revenue balance of companies 
related to the owner-major shareholder. Sponsorship from such companies is permitted, but the 
amounts should be adjusted based on fair value. 
The example: Manchester City has close sponsorship with "Etihad Airways," an Emirate Abu 
Dhabi company, whose sheikh Halifa is a half-brother of the owner of "citizens," Sheikh Mansour. 
The 10-year agreement announced in summer 2011 between a company and a club provides 
sponsorship in various forms (stadium naming, ads in the training center, social events, etc.) for 
£ 400,000,000 in total. 
Relative relationships alone are not sufficient to make the particular case fall into the particular 
category of related party transactions. If it turns out that Sheikh Khalifa retains any influence on 
Manchester City, then UEFA will activate the relevant mechanisms by looking at the size of the 
sponsorship. 
In this case, a UEFA Special Committee will make comparisons with market prices (what are the 
respective previous sponsorships in the group, what are the corresponding sponsorships from 
other groups in the same country, why a higher price is justified for the club under review etc.), 
and if it judges excessive sponsorship, then it will adjust the price that will be calculated as the 
relevant income in the club's balance sheet.  
 
 
Transfer Cost Annual Depreciation 
Charge 
50m euro 10m euro 40m euro 
 
Book value at the end 
of the first season 
 30m euro Book value at the end 
of the second season 
20m euro Book value at the end 
of the third season 
10m euro Book value at the end 
of the fourth season 
0m euro Book value at the end 
of the fifth season 
Condition to avoid penalty 
 
 
 
 
2.5 What is depreciation and how is it calculated? 
Depreciation is essentially the sharing of a player's transcription costs into the years of the 
contract he signs for accounting purposes. This practice results in the cost of transcription being 
a payroll cost for each year. Its association with the FFP is essentially an ally for the groups, which 
can save a lot of money from this accounting practice. 
The example: One team buys a player from another team for 50,000,000 euros for 5 years. In her 
books she will deduct 10,000,000 (50/5) at the end of each season as a transfer fee and this 
amount will be deducted from the player's book value, so that at the end of his contract (if he 
exits) he has zero bookkeeping value. This translates the FFP data into the transfer costs. For this 
reason, UEFA also mentions transfers with a more correct term: obtaining a player's registration. 
If that player is sold before his 5-year contract ends, then his club stops recording him in his 
books. From the sale proceeds (which are all counted and not shared), the player's book value is 
deducted in the year of sale (in this example, in the 3rd year) and the result of the season comes 
out. 
   
Deprecation of a player who has renewed his contract 
 
Transfer Cost Annual Depreciation 
Charge 
 
50m euro 10m euro 40m euro Book value at the end of the first season 
 30m euro Book value at the end of the second season 
20m euro Book value at the end of the third season 
 
 
Sale Value Deductible Book Value P\L 
35m euro 20m euro +15m euro 
 
 
Sale Value Deductible Book Value P\L 
10m euro 20m euro -10m euro 
 
 
 
 
2.6 Players with shared rights 
The phenomenon of companies that take part of a player's rights by contributing economically 
to his transfer is common in Latin American countries and in countries such as Portugal and Spain. 
Atletico Madrid has made a number of such agreements, with a more classic example of the 
acquisition of Radamell Falcao with the help of Doyen. On the contrary, in England and in France, 
the involvement of an extracorporeal player in player transfers is prohibited by regulations. In 
addition, two clubs may hold the rights of one footballer, a practice which is very popular in Italy. 
The FFP regulates such cases as regards the revenue and expenditure side. In Annex VII, (C) (5) 
(b), it is expressly underlined that in order to calculate an association in its revenues the money 
earned from the grant of a player's share of rights, that player must definitely withdraw from the 
group by transfer. Only at that time will this money be included in the proceeds. On the contrary, 
if he wants to buy a player with the financial contribution of a third company, then he will show 
the costs the full amount he will pay at the time he pays it. 
The example: A team allocates 35% of a player to a company for a fee, but retains him in its 
roster. These earnings will only be shown on the FFP balance sheet in the season that the player 
will be withdrawn from the roster with a transcript. If the team collects other money, then it will 
add them to existing revenue. 
 
 
 
2.7 About the penalties 
If club passes from the Audit Committee to the Court of Auditors, it will have to wait for a penalty. 
It has 9 levels, none of which is associated with a particular misconduct. The penalty for a club 
that has not complied with the FFP provisions may be: 
 
(a) warning and / or 
 
(b) reprimand and / or 
 
(c) a fine and / or 
 
d) deduction of points (from group stages) and / or 
 
(e) retention of prizes from European competitions and / or 
 
(f) a ban on declaring new players in European competitions and / or 
 
(g) limiting the number of players it may declare in European competitions and / or 
 
h) exclusion from an ongoing or future European event and / or 
 
(i) deduction of title or prize 
 
This is the most "sensitive" area of the FFP, because since the conception of the idea until today, 
UEFA has not formally stated on which case the penalty will be imposed and on what criteria a 
fine or exclusion will be decided from European competitions. 
Theoretically and on the basis of what has been suggested by UEFA, the goal in the first two years 
of the FFP is to exclude any group if it has break even problems in order to give a reasonable 
adjustment period, to cover a big "opening", as in the case of Manchester City. 
However, UEFA Secretary General Gianni Infantino has often stood on the intentions of each club 
to show its finances and compliance. Therefore, even if it exceeds the threshold of € 45,000,000, 
if the balance sheets show a reduction in the annual deficit, then UEFA will not resort to the 
stricter penalties provided by the statutes. 
If, however, a team with an opening of € 6,000,000 over a period of three years does not have 
shareholders willing or able to meet the € 1,000,000 required by the FFP, it can be excluded from 
European competitions, even if its financial position is much better than the City. 
The example: Everything is a matter of reading and a different approach in every case, at least 
until it is resolved. As a result, Manchester City with an opening of over € 100,000,000 for the 
three-year turnover surveyed for participating in the 2014-2015 European Championships was 
fined € 60,000,000, with a roster restricted to the next Champions League from 21 players to 25 
(without affecting the mandatory number of 8 native players as defined by UEFA), a pay bench 
for the next season equal to this season. However, it was not excluded from the Champions 
League of the new season. 
In the summer of 2012, Europa League and Super Cap European champion, Atletico Madrid, was 
one of the first 23 teams to be punished under the FFP regulations. Its penalty was withholding 
the bonus until it resolved the issue of the debts to the Spanish Tax Office. Rohimbangos had 
debts of € 175,000,000 and executed a repayment plan in over a decade, with annual interest of 
4.5%. By presenting the agreement before September 30, 2012 to UEFA, they avoided further 
sanctions and received the prize. 
 
Licensing for European competitions goes not only through the financial provisions of the FFP. 
An association must meet a set of conditions outlined in dozens of pages of FFP regulations. 
These include minimum requirements for infrastructure (e.g. UEFA stage, open training 
throughout the year), staff (e.g. secretary, general manager, financial manager, doctor, etc.) in 
academies (e.g. at least 2 groups at level k15-21, one at level k10-14 and one at level k10 etc.) 
and at a legal level (e.g. compliance agreement with UEFA rules, etc.). 
In addition to the break even for the settlement of arrears, a club will also have to present new 
season budgets to prove to UEFA that it maintains absolute control of its finances. If it fails in any 
of these areas, then UEFA will impose (if so) any of the above mentioned penalties. 
 
 
3. UEFA “Financial Fair Play Regulation” and accounting implications 
Regulations in recent years have really balanced the disturbed budgets of European football. As 
it is stated in the UEFA website, the new fair play was a turning point in the discussion with the 
national associations and other interested parties (ECA, European Football Associations, FIFPro 
Europe).  
The decisions taken: 
• The new regulations will increase transparency, as clubs will be required to publish their 
financial data, including payments to managers. 
• There will be greater harmonization of financial and accounting principles for football 
transactions, with specific accounting requirements for player transfers. 
• A broader approach to anticipating potential economic problems will be adopted, with a 
set of new indicators to allow closer monitoring of budgets by the Club Financial Control 
Body (CFCB). The indices are: a sustainable debt ratio, which will improve the tracking of 
the club's debt position, and the deficit ratio for player transfers, which will improve the 
tracking of transfers by clubs that exceed a certain limit. 
Finally, it is planned to introduce different requirements to ensure better protection and 
placement for new players (introduction of child protection policies, new medical requirements 
and better youth development programs), as well as improving standards and encouraging the 
development of women's soccer in Europe. 
 
 
 
3.1 Economic objectives of the new regulation 
• Improvement of the financial capacity of the FCI by increasing their transparency and 
credibility. 
• Prioritization of the protection of creditors by ensuring that the FCI will settle debts to 
third parties (state, athletes, local players, etc.) on time. 
• Introduction of greater discipline and logic in the financial management of FCAs. 
• Encouragement of FCs to operate on their own revenues. 
 
  
3.2 Financial Conditions 
• Publication of annual and quarterly financial statements audited by certified auditors-
accountants. 
• Clubs must not have outstanding debts to third parties until March 31 (prior to receiving 
the license) for transactions made until December 31 of the previous year. 
• Presentation of the future financial statements proving the smooth operation of the 
FCA. 
• Clubs must not have a negative net asset and certified by a statutory auditor that they 
cannot continue operating. 
 
3.3 Basic financial licensing condition (Break-Even requirements) 
• Relevant income: tickets, TV rights, sponsorship and advertising, commercial activities, 
other operating income, income or profits from the sale of athletic contracts, profits or 
proceeds from the sale of fixed assets, financial income. 
• This category does not include income from non-sports activities and non-measurable 
financial assets. 
• Relevant expenses: cost of sales, salary and personnel fees, other operating expenses, 
depreciation of athletes' contracts, financial expenses and dividends. 
• This category does not include depreciation of materials and immaterial fixed assets 
(excluding athletes' contracts), academic expenses, social offers, non-measurable 
financial assets, financial expenses associated with the construction of fixed assets and 
overheads or taxes not related to its sporting activity of FCs. 
 
3.4 Accounting Result 
• The difference between relevant income and expenses is the result of a balance. 
• If the revenue is greater than the expense over a specific time period, then the Club has 
a Break-Even surplus. If the opposite occurs, there is a Break-Even deficit. 
• The maximum deficit that a FCA may have in a period of time is € 5 million (acceptable 
deviation). 
 
 
 
  
 
3.5 Infringement Rules 
• Club's failure to continue functioning. 
• Negative net worth (Total assets - total liabilities <0 from one period to the next) 
• Break-Even deficit for one or two previous years greater than acceptable deviation. 
• Outstanding debts 
• UEFA may request additional financial information when staff costs account for 70% of 
total revenue, and the total debt of a football club is 100% of total revenue. 
Approval for licensing: None of the above conditions has been violated and the club has a 
surplus for the past two years or a deficit within the allowable deviation of 5 million, taking into 
account any surplus over three and four years. 
 
3.6 Accounting principles and standards 
• The standards to be followed by the clubs for the preparation of the financial 
statements are the national accounting standards or the IFRSs. 
• Basic accounting principles to be complied with are the principle of fair presentation of 
financial information, the consistency of presentation, the accrual principle, separate 
presentation of each class of accounts. 
• Financial Conditions:  
1. Balance sheet 
2. Income Statement 
3. Cash Flow Statement 
4. Explanatory notes 
5. Financial report of the administration of the club 
 
3.7 Transfer accounting 
• Costs related to the development of new athletes from club’s academies are only 
recorded on the balance sheet than the value of the athletes from a market-purchase. 
• If the value of the athletes is restored below the balance sheet, then the amount stated 
will be reduced to the actual level and the difference is charged to the profit and loss 
account as revaluation cost. 
• The value of an athlete's contract will be gradually depreciated over the lifetime of the 
athlete (contract duration) 
• Only the direct costs of acquiring the athlete are capitalized and the value of the 
contract on the balance sheet cannot be upgraded. 
 
4. CASE STUDIES 
 
Below, we will see some cases from some European teams which, for separate reasons, they did 
not comply with the provisions of the FFP and therefore did not manage to avoid being punished 
by UEFA. Of course this will be much more understandable, since the financial data some of them 
will be presented in another chapter. 
 
 
4.1 Exclusion of Milan 
The judiciary of the UEFA clubs' financial control body has decided to impose a blockade of 
European competitions on "rosoneri" for violations of the Financial Fair Play provisions and the 
decision became known on Wednesday 27/06/2018. 
The punishment concerns their next presence in the European competitions until 2020, which 
has already been secured and would be the participation in the Europa League of the 2018-2019 
season. According to UEFA's announcement, AC Milan can appeal to CAS, but the hopes of 
changing something there are infinitesimal. 
The Italian club is basically punished for their inability to show balanced income and expenses, 
since the last three seasons of Silvio Berlusconi had a total loss of around 300,000,000 euros. 
Despite the actions of the new administration to match the finances, the loss of important 
sponsorship agreements that reduced revenue has inhibited efforts in convincing UEFA that it is 
operating a consolidation plan. 
In addition, during the season, the European confederation rejected both the voluntary 
agreement proposed by Milan and the compromise agreement, through which the Italian club 
would accept the violations and accept a more lenient punishment. 
 
 
4.2 The punishment of Manchester City 
It is known that citizens receive a lot of money from sponsorships of companies controlled by 
Abu Dhabi and its owner's family, Mansour. Among them are Etihad, Etisalat, Aabar (shares in 
UniCredit and Virgin Galactic) and the Abu Dhabi Tourism Ministry. Since 2010, therefore, 
Mansour has used these companies, to invest money in the City, which the FFP explicitly forbids. 
This was done either by re-pricing or by the renegotiation of sponsorship agreements. Companies 
with a sponsorship agreement with the City have paid the bonuses to achieve targets (goal 
achievement) without achieving them. In other examples, the club asked companies to pay 
upfront the money for their sponsorship. 
All of these companies received money from the Abu Dhabi United Group, owned by Mansour, 
and then transferred to the club via overstated sponsorships.  
The club was required to comply with the following requirements: 
- Maximum damage of EUR 20,000,000 for the financial year 2014 and a maximum loss of EUR 
10,000,000 for the financial year 2015. 
- In the income statement calculations in the settlement period, Manchester City should not 
attempt to improve the financial terms with two commercial partners. 
- Income from sales of assets internally of the group would not be accounted for in future balance 
sheets. 
- The wage costs (of the football section and officials) should not be increased for the next two 
seasons. 
- Throughout the compromise period, City was subject to a limitation of the number of players it 
could declare on the A list for its participation in UEFA competitions. For the 2014-2015 season, 
City could claim up to 21 players instead of 25. 
- Reduce transfer costs for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 seasons. 
- Limitation of number of new entries in the A list for participation in UEFA competitions. The 
exact limitation depended on the net transferring position of City in each of the periods of the 
agreement. 
- A fine of EUR 60,000,000, which would be withheld from the proceeds of its participation in the 
European competitions of the 2013-2014 season. Of this amount, the € 40,000,000 would be 
returned if the City fulfilled its obligations to the Audit Body of the Associations. 
- The City was obliged to produce every 6 months a progress report that would substantiate its 
compliance with all agreed measures. 
 
 
 
4.3 Paris Saint Germain penalized for breaches of FFP 
Paris St-Germain's £167m agreement with the Qatar Tourism Authority was the cause the French 
club failed the rules of financial fair play. The sponsorship deal was considered to have an unfair 
worth by the independent investigation panel of UEFA. 
That means the French champions, who reached the Champions League quarter-finals the season 
of 2014, exceeded allowed financial deficits by a wide margin. Under FFP, clubs are limited to 
losses of £37m over the past two years. Clubs who fail the FFP test have been offered a 
settlement deal by the investigation panel, although the details remain unknown. The club was 
required to comply with the following requirements: 
- Maximum damage of EUR 30,000,000 for the financial year 2015 and zero loss for the financial 
year 2016. 
- In the cost-benefit calculations in the conciliation period, Paris Saint-Germain's agreement with 
Qatar Tourism Authority was adjusted to market prices much lower than those of the club's 
revenue estimates, and will apply for as long as the trade agreement is in force. 
- The wage costs (of the football section and officials) have not increased for the next two periods 
since the imposition of the penalty. 
- Throughout the compromise period, Paris was subject to a limitation of the number of players 
who could declare in the A list for her participation in UEFA competitions. For the 2014-2015 
season, Paris has declared 21 players instead of 25. 
- Reduce transfer costs for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 seasons. 
- Limitation of number of new entries in the A list for participation in UEFA competitions. The 
exact limitation depends on Paris's net transcriptional position in each of the periods of the 
agreement. 
- A fine of 60,000,000 euros, which had been withheld from the proceeds of her income for her 
participation in the European competitions of the 2013-2014 season. Of this amount, the € 
40,000,000 would be refunded as long as Paris fulfilled its obligations to the Audit Body of the 
Associations. 
- Paris was obliged to draw up every 6 months a progress report that would substantiate its 
compliance with all the measures agreed. 
 
4.4 Galatasaray’s case 
2 March 2016: 
UEFA has announced since January the possible punishment of Galatasaray as a result of 
irregularities in Financial Fair Play. More specifically, the Turkish club seemed to have exceeded 
the allowable limit of financial losses on the balance sheet, thus endangering it. 
Thus, on Wednesday afternoon, UEFA proceeded to exemplary Galatasaray punishment for the 
2016-2017 and 2017-2018 seasons. Initially, Turkish media had leaked out that the punishment 
would have been a season, but as UEFA confirmed, Galatasaray has been outside European 
competitions for two consecutive years. 
23 June 2016: 
The CAS finalized Galatasaray's two-year blockade of European competitions, rejecting the 
Turkish club's appeal against UEFA's decision. The European Football Confederation imposed this 
penalty on Galatasaray for breaches of financial fair-play regulations and CAS has today ratified 
its punishment. 
The Istanbul team had won the "Europa League" season ticket 2016-17, through the conquest of 
the Cup. Osmanlispor, who last Monday entered the draw of the qualifying round B, will now 
take its place. 
 
4.5 Barcelona sells players due to Financial Fair Play 
5 January 2016:  
How does the strongest group in the world strengthen? And especially when? Barcelona from 
tomorrow can formally join the potential of Arda Turan and Aleix Vidal, as the FIFA punishment 
imposed on her on the transfer ban has been finalized. But the problems are not solved. Wins 
have increased operating costs. Starting with player wages, the percentages between earnings 
and wages increased by 8 points, from 65% to 73%, above the 70% threshold. Its roster is worth 
about 700 million euros, while additions are being considered, such as the one of Pogba, in a few 
days. the issue of Neymar renewal will be discussed with EUR 10 million being made EUR 20 
million, as the Brazilian striker has requested. 
The truth is that Barcelona has no room for operating profit, so it has to join sales, since it cannot 
make other moves without breaking Fair Play. It may not be happening in January, but in the 
summer, but Maserano, Pike, Danny Alves, Ter Stegen and Adriano, it seems that outside of 
unexpected will change the shirt. Also, the issue with its sponsor Qatar Airways should be clarified 
as the Spaniards they argue that maybe one step before the cessation of co-operation, even if 
the contract expires in 2021. 
 
4.6 UEFA punishes harshly Malaga 
The case of Malaga is the most indicative of the wide scope covered by the FFP and is not limited 
to club break even. 
The Andalusian club was punished in 2013, shortly after its episodic blockade in the Champions 
League quarter-finals. Cause of EUR 8,450,000 in arrears to Spain's tax office. The case came to 
CAS, with Malaga claiming that it had entered into an interim suspension agreement to the 
Spanish state before June 30, 2013, which was the deadline for UEFA. The club also argued that 
it could not be held responsible for the delay of the Spanish authorities to issue the relevant letter 
of the agreement, which they submitted too late. 
CAS dismissed the appeal, arguing that the FFP regulations defined the overdue debt as "non-
agreed" (not taking into account the Spanish State's obstruction) and therefore upheld the 
exclusion penalty from the two European competitions in the next 4 years and a fine of 300,000 
euros. 
 
4.7 Financial Fair Play “hurts” Inter 
More problems with the Financial Fair Play regulation may be in the summer of Inter Milan, which 
has already been restricted to its transfers. Particularly, Nerazzurri should earn at least EUR 40 
million through transfers before the start of the summer transfer period (30/6/2019). 
If the Milanese does not comply with the rules of the FFP, the club may receive a severe 
punishment even with a kick-off from the Champions League next season. 
With a possible sale of Mauro Icardi or Ivan Pericic in the winter, this obstacle can easily be 
overcome, losing a major player. 
  
 
5. A general view of the top level in Europe 
Starting with the analysis of the data, in order to have a global picture, we will need to study 
our sample. This will consist of the two teams with the most domestic championship winnings 
in their tournaments. The top five leagues were selected, including England, Germany, Spain, 
Italy and France. The competition there for discrimination is higher, as opposed to sub-league 
leagues such as Greece, Turkey, etc. This may be because these five countries are the most 
powerful economies in Europe but also because they have the largest consumer audience, 
those who buy tickets, jerseys, club subscriptions, and so on. We would describe these clubs as 
key players of the football market and the proof is the table below: 
 
Football Club Domestic Leagues Domestic Cups Champions League 
Barcelona 25 30 5 
Bayern Munich 28 18 5 
Borussia Dortmund 8 4 1 
Juventus 34 13 2 
Liverpool 18 8 5 
Manchester United 20 5 3 
Milan 18 5 7 
Olympique Lyonnais 7 5 - 
Paris Saint Germain 7 12 - 
Real Madrid 33 19 13 
 
Among these clubs, mainly at European level, competition can become ruthless and often go 
beyond the limits, or sometimes there are cases that have already happened, as in some 
examples that have been mentioned earlier.  
 
 
5.1 General financial situation of the sample 
 Total Assets (th Euro) 
Club 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Barcelona 760,199 
 
546,484 
 
615,239 
 
493,766 
 
503,185 
 
451,277 
 
509,464 
 
Bayern Munich 675,453 660,845 562,808 588,100 535,357 509,194 518,637 
       
Borussia 
Dortmund 
478,597 424,545 386,539 292,295 302,415 248,706 221,726 
Juventus  847,240 577,558 474,267 495,921 443,367 427,782 334,040 
Liverpool 550,902 581,637 510,253 278,522 269,420 280,490 312,715 
Manchester 
United 
1,051,286 901,936 837,972 614,951 504,092 466,126 487,668 
Milan  388,045 315,200 370,188 291,301 354,595 334,284 363,756 
Olympique 
Lyonnais  
614,205 604,397 467,481 309,478 215,475 202,248 259,966 
Paris Saint 
Germain  
612,800 579,592 633,006 595,171 407,790 262,768 64,506 
Real Madrid 1,045,119 1,031,690 977,486 860,415 871,164 731,224 657,971 
 
 
 
 
As we can easily observe, we see that there were generally no significant fluctuations in the 
assets of these clubs. Our chart shows the change in assets during the enforcement of the 
regulation until the ending of 2017 and at least during this time we observe that the European 
football elite shows stability and robustness in terms of financial exposures. 
Regarding to the size of total assets, this can vary from club to club and always has to do with 
the goals of the club, the fans, the titles and the investors who strengthen them. In our 
example, it is no coincidence that real is the club that has always had the most total assets, 
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since it is the most successful club on the planet with most European and world trophies and 
not only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Turnovers 
 Operating Revenue (th Euro) 
Club 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Barcelona 648,218 620,115 560,697 484,639 482,588 482,999 450,654 
B. Munich 640,458 626,801 523,684 528,656 432,763 373,367 328,455 
B. Dortmund 409,936 379,767 293,029 265,962 307,817 222,869 155,785 
Juventus  559,672 386,108 343,635 312,984 281,912 212,291 172,066 
Liverpool 416,751 395,481 414,138 315,957 241,139 211,250 209,620 
M. United 328,713 279,759 256,543 293,936 239,063 232,209 236,017 
Milan  100,665 223,943 221,035 232,322 278,713 275,870 266,811 
O. Lyonnais  208,959 160,004 96,859 104,434 101,535 132,053 154,851 
PSG  484,750 527,353 477,198 460,819 399,524 225,226 90,679 
Real Madrid 619,939 576,781 518,365 481,801 478,836 349,455 331,242 
 
  
As we can see here, the sizes vary from club to club, but the proportions over the years remain 
almost identical. So the four clubs with the biggest revenue are right now and the clubs that 
have a leading role in the Champions League, while the other clubs have for years been away 
from some distinction in the top club competition. While in the top four we also see the 
Barcelona and Pari Saint Germain, two of the clubs that each of them for its own reasons 
employed the regulation of FFP. 
 
5.3 P\L After taxes 
 P\L After taxes  (th Euro) 
Club 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Barcelona 18,134 28,769 15,150 41,118 32,488 48,781 -9,325 
B. Munich 39,190 33,037 23,827 16,523 14,022 11,056 2,193 
B. Dortmund 8,209 29,436 5,532 11,970 51,193 27,530 5,400 
Juventus  42,568 4,062 2,298 -6,674 -15,911 -48,654 -95,414 
Liverpool 44,779 -27,875 82,714 510 -58,312 -50,653 -56,382 
M. United -97,465 -100,497 -86,136 -39,953 -13,352 -2,823 10,474 
Milan  -32,624 -74,871 -89,301 -91,285 -15,723 -6,857 -67,334 
O. Lyonnais  4,672 9,805 -21,434 -26,436 -19,859 -27,238 -28,033 
PSG  -6,846 8,162 8,910 -2,900 -4,120 -5,660 0 
Real Madrid 30,280 42,018 38,326 36,726 24,054 35,254 35,182 
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 First of all, what we see from the chart is that from 2011 to 2017, almost all teams except 
Manchester United and Pari Saint Germain managed to improve their profitability. Concerning 
PSG and Manchester, there are two clubs that have invested in recent years probably the most 
enormous amounts in transfers that apparently have not yet depreciated. Regarding to Milan, it 
suffered from very serious financial problems and, as a result, failed to secure its participation 
in European competitions, as a result it didn’t managed to receive UEFA’s bonus for its 
participation, income from the tickets from the European competitions, and at the same time it 
had been trying to retain a high-value roster as well that led to today's result.  
Then, as we can see, the most interesting cases are the profitability of Bayern Munich, Borussia 
Dortmund, Barcelona and Real Madrid. These clubs manage to score significant profit rates in 
this period, each for their own reasons. Real, as we all know, is the team with the most cups in 
the Spanish championship and the Champions League, something that has increased its 
popularity to a huge extent, as a result of counting today most fans around the world who, as 
we have already said, are the consumers of football sector. The other three clubs of course 
have their fans, who support them in all competitions, but they are among the few clubs that 
have limited their transfer costs and have turned over the last few years to develop their 
academies and to promote their own children in the first team, and many times even manage 
to sell them to other clubs for a lot of money. 
The remaining clubs, as we see, have also undergone financial crisis in the period under review 
but today they are able to score positive signs of profitability. 
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 5.4 Indicator Study 
In this section we will study all the necessary financial indices for each club individually in order 
to get a complete picture of what is happening in each case. First of all, a few words in detail for 
each indicator: 
• As far as corporate financing is concerned, return on equity (ROE) is a measure of a 
company's profitability in relation to equity, also known as net assets or assets less 
liabilities. ROE is a measure of how well a business uses investments to generate profits. 
The formula is: ROE= Net Income/Shareholders Equity 
• Return on assets (ROA) is an indicator which counts the profitability of a business 
relating to its total assets. ROA gives an investor, manager, or analyst an idea as to how 
efficient a business' management is at using its assets to generate profit. Return on 
assets is displayed as a percentage and it is calculated as: ROA = Net Income / Total 
Assets 
• The current ratio is a liquidity ratio that counts a business' ability to pay long-term and 
short-term obligations. Analysts compare current assets to current liabilities in order to 
calculate the current ratio. Current Ratio = Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
• Debt/Equity Ratio is used to assess a company's financial leverage. 
Debt/Equity Ratio= Total Liabilities/ Shareholders Equity 
• There are a variety of metrics in order to measure profitability. EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) is one ratio of a company's financial 
performance and it is used to determine the earning potential of a company. EBITDA = 
Net Profit + Interest +Taxes + Depreciation + Amortization 
 
All data for the calculation of the above financial ratios are derived from the balance 
sheets of the clubs and all the amounts are calculated in th Euro. 
 
 
5.4.1 Barcelona 
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 18,134 760,199 209,991 587,983 56,983 115,347 
2016 28,769 546,484 133,916 407,586 41,603 97,295 
2015 15,150 615,239 177,697 444,590 102,041 68,608 
2014 41,118 493,766 134,840 378,766 61,460 53,540 
2013 32,488 503,185 145,800 397,403 93,355 12,427 
2012 48,781 451,277 101,581 316,777 154,469 -19,969 
2011 -9,325 509,464 183,608 409,970 168,152 -68,658 
 Year Debt to Equity ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 5.59705987 15.72125846 2.385428026 0.357137876 111,217 
2016 4.616773729 29.56883704 5.264381025 0.328558881 120,342 
2015 7.967452775 22.08197295 2.462457679 0.399687352 104,942 
2014 8.222375794 76.79865521 8.327426352 0.355998162 134,325 
2013 39.49126901 261.4307556 6.456472272 0.366881981 118,454 
2012 -23.59887826 -244.2836396 10.80954713 0.320670377 125,758 
2011 -8.420315185 13.5818113 -1.83035504 0.44785716 66,386 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Bayern 
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 39,190 675,453 280,267 163,108 68,887 443,458 
2016 33,037 660,845 235,269 160,561 84,014 416,270 
2015 23,827 562,808 180,985 118,816 53,260 390,732 
2014 16,523 588,100 211,757 135,215 77,370 375,515 
2013 14,022 535,357 166,118 133,180 144,939 257,238 
2012 11,056 509,194 154,697 122,140 138,336 248,718 
2011 1,286 518,637 188,778 134,826 145,050 238,761 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 0.523149881 8.837364531 5.802032118 1.718290948 149,091 
2016 0.587539337 7.936435487 4.999205563 1.465293564 142,502 
2015 0.440393927 6.098041624 4.233592984 1.523237611 111,310 
2014 0.566115868 4.400090542 2.809556198 1.566076249 98,695 
2013 1.081173855 5.450983136 2.619186823 1.247319417 95,578 
2012 1.047274423 4.44519496 2.171274603 1.266554773 86,041 
2011 1.17220149 0.538613928 0.247957627 1.400160206 63,206 
 
 
 
5.4.3 Borussia Dortmund 
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 8,209 478,453 147,027 147,734 18,561 312,158 
2016 29,436 424,545 152,007 89,439 25,564 309,542 
2015 5,532 386,539 170,435 76,824 23,637 286,078 
2014 11,970 292,295 99,925 90,443 56,603 145,249 
2013 51,193 302,415 45,807 95,286 66,511 140,618 
2012 27,530 248,706 95,229 86,867 68,384 93,455 
2011 5,400 518,637 188,778 134,826 145,050 238,761 
 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 0.532727016 2.629758007 1.715738014 0.995214372 74,073 
2016 0.37152632 9.50953344 6.933540614 1.699560594 86,668 
2015 0.351166465 1.933738351 1.431162185 2.218512444 55,594 
2014 1.012371858 8.241020592 4.095177817 1.104839512 49,132 
2013 1.150613719 36.40572331 16.92806243 0.480731692 87,531 
2012 1.661238029 29.45802793 11.06929467 1.096262102 59,979 
2011 1.17220149 2.261675902 1.041190659 1.400160206 32,442 
 
 
 
 
5.4.4 Juventus               
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 42,568 847,240 326,179 427,480 325,986 93,774 
2016 4,062 577,558 175,014 267,059 257,116 53,383 
2015 2,298 474,267 158,163 312,813 116,809 44,645 
2014 -6,674 495,921 178,192 317,761 135,533 42,627 
2013 -15,911 443,367 126,885 254,794 139,942 48,631 
2012 -48,654 427,782 89,936 213,932 149,241 64,609 
2011 -95,414 518,637 188,778 134,826 145,050 238,761 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 8.034913729 45.39424574 5.024314244 0.76302751 159,381 
2016 9.819137179 7.609163966 0.703305988 0.655338333 84,739 
2015 9.623070893 5.147272931 0.484537191 0.505615176 79,829 
2014 10.63396439 -15.65674338 -1.345778864 0.560773663 65,717 
2013 8.116962431 -32.71781374 -3.588674845 0.497990534 55,357 
2012 5.621089941 -75.30529802 -11.37355008 0.420395266 578 
2011 1.17220149 -39.96213787 -18.3970677 1.400160206 -32,477 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.5 Liverpool      
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 44,779 550,902 141,534 301,411 136,744 112,747 
2016 -27,875 581,637 143,973 369,966 133,748 77,923 
2015 82,714 510,253 157,571 324,366 68,720 117,167 
2014 510 278,522 69,528 221,867 111,256 -54,601 
2013 -58,312 269,420 64,243 212,400 109,182 -52,162 
2012 -50,653 280,490 73,852 141,458 132,459 6,573 
2011 -56,382 312,715 79,034 211,731 48,741 52,243 
 
Year Debt to Equity ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 3.88617879 39.71635609 8.128305942 0.469571449 84,327 
2016 6.464253173 -35.77249336 -4.792508042 0.389151976 25,728 
2015 3.354920754 70.59496275 16.21038975 0.485781494 101,725 
2014 -6.101042105 -0.934048827 0.183109413 0.313376933 13,263 
2013 -6.165062689 111.7901921 -21.64353055 0.302462335 22,472 
2012 41.67305644 -770.6222425 -18.05875432 0.522077224 13,888 
2011 4.985777999 -107.9225925 -18.02983547 0.373275524 -56,139 
 
 5.4.6 Manchester United     
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 -97,465 1,051,286 534,609 1,199,654 95,218 -243,586 
2016 -100,497 901,936 424,077 999,749 58,201 -156,014 
2015 -86,136 837,972 304,182 750,386 145,212 -57,626 
2014 -39,953 614,951 180,127 478,793 110,844 25,314 
2013 -13,352 504,092 196,479 368,568 74,082 61,442 
2012 -2,823 466,126 158,860 310,856 76,325 78,945 
2011 10,474 487,668 199,731 335,366 79,225 73,077 
 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 -5.315872012 40.0125623 -9.271026153 0.445635992 15,249 
2016 -6.781122207 64.41537298 -11.14236487 0.42418347 -10,359 
2015 -15.5415611 149.4741957 -10.2791024 0.405367371 5,595 
2014 23.29292091 -157.8296595 -6.496940407 0.376210596 22,966 
2013 7.204355327 -21.73106344 -2.648722852 0.533087517 26,608 
2012 4.9044398 -3.575907277 -0.605630237 0.511040482 29,638 
2011 5.673344554 14.33282702 2.147772665 0.595561267 63,131 
 
 
 
 
5.4.7 Milan    
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 -32,624 338,045 114,018 286,158 128,436 -76,549 
2016 -74,871 315,200 134,769 290,445 75,182 -50,427 
2015 -89,301 370,188 141,165 311,082 92,475 -33,369 
2014 -91,285 291,301 125,451 374,743 10,764 -94,206 
2013 -15,723 354,595 144,118 374,179 47,337 -66,921 
2012 -6,857 334,284 134,361 341,316 47,916 -54,948 
2011 -67,334 363,756 129,715 335,366 16,506 11,884 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 -5.416060301 42.61845354 -9.650786138 0.398444216 -294 
2016 -7.250619708 148.4740318 -23.75348985 0.464008676 -9,455 
2015 -12.09376967 267.6166502 -24.12314824 0.453787104 -24,154 
2014 -4.09217035 96.89934824 -31.33700193 0.334765426 -5,144 
2013 -6.29871042 23.49486708 -4.434072674 0.385157906 52,723 
2012 -7.083642717 12.47907112 -2.051249835 0.393655733 8,431 
2011 29.6088859 -566.5937395 -18.51075996 0.386786377 -14,896 
 
5.4.8 Olympique Lyonnais   
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 4,672 614,205 125,212 286,158 237,299 90,748 
2016 9,805 604,397 132,147 290,445 331,240 -17,288 
2015 -21,434 467,481 118,916 311,082 223,818 -67,419 
2014 -26,436 309,478 116,313 374,743 108,482 -173,747 
2013 -19,859 215,475 75,514 374,179 47,712 -206,416 
2012 -27,238 202,248 64,325 341,316 48,646 -187,714 
2011 -28,033 259,966 109,602 335,366 43,927 -119,327 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 5.768248336 5.148322828 0.760658086 0.437562465 10,746 
2016 -35.96049283 -56.71564091 1.622278072 0.45498115 -7,744 
2015 -7.933965203 31.79222474 -4.584999176 0.382265769 -11,317 
2014 -2.7811991 15.21522674 -8.542125773 0.310380714 -24,010 
2013 -2.043887102 9.620862724 -9.216382411 0.201812502 -25,573 
2012 -2.077426297 14.51037216 -13.46762391 0.188461719 -10,141 
2011 -3.178601658 23.4925876 -10.78333321 0.326813094 19,694 
 
5.4.9 Pari Saint Germain  
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 -6,846 612,800 418,386 517,530 26,634 68,636 
2016 8,162 579,592 377,407 489,288 34,794 55,510 
2015 8,910 633,006 417,852 380,411 205,163 47,432 
2014 -2,900 595,171 305,160 511,680 44,884 38,607 
2013 -4,120 407,790 220,591 352,534 13,947 41,309 
2012 -5,660 262,768 164,861 248,796 18,542 -4,570 
2011 -1 64,506 47,274 61,505 1,911 1,090 
 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 7.928259223 -9.97435748 -1.117167102 0.808428497 93,387 
2016 9.441217799 14.703657 1.408231998 0.77133917 98,819 
2015 12.34554731 18.78478664 1.407569596 1.098422496 98,639 
2014 14.41614215 -7.511591162 -0.487254923 0.596388368 68,968 
2013 8.871698661 -9.973613498 -1.010323941 0.625729717 65,958 
2012 -58.49846827 123.8512035 -2.153991354 0.662635251 40,350 
2011 58.17981651 -0.091743119 -0.001550243 0.768620437 -17,067 
 
 
5.4.10 Real Madrid  
Year Net 
Income 
Total 
Assets 
Current 
Assets 
Current 
Liabilities 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
Equity 
2017 30,280 1,045,119 339,856 425,485 117,386 502,248 
2016 42,018 1,031,690 237,416 372,171 247,406 412,113 
2015 38,326 977,486 271,002 368,592 239,499 369,395 
2014 36,726 860,415 246,408 346,965 202,514 310,936 
2013 24,054 871,164 252,518 376,017 220,793 274,354 
2012 35,254 731,224 202,804 354,635 200,493 176,096 
2011 35,182 657,971 181,224 286,687 230,442 140,842 
 
 
Year Debt to 
Equity 
ROE% ROA% Current 
Ratio 
EBITDA 
2017 1.080882353 6.028894092 2.897277726 0.798749662 162,882 
2016 1.503415325 10.19574728 4.072735027 0.637921816 203,449 
2015 1.646180917 10.37534347 3.92087457 0.735235708 164,182 
2014 1.767177168 11.81143386 4.268405363 0.710181142 149,882 
2013 2.175328226 8.767504757 2.76113338 0.671560062 153,759 
2012 3.152416864 20.01976195 4.821231251 0.571866849 96,408 
2011 3.671695943 24.97976456 5.347044171 0.632131907 66,107 
 
6. Conclusions  
In the context of this paper, it was explained that UEFA's Financial Fair Play is a regulation that 
all teams have to observe in any domestic league in Europe of independent capacity in order to 
qualify for participation in European competitions. The reason for Financial Fair Play is to impose 
a good financial management on the groups and to prevent counterfeiting of results, since sports 
societies, like the rest economic units, they can use the various accounting mechanisms that exist 
to fine-tune their results.  
The major European clubs showed growth of 3% between 2011 and 2017, which is totally 
opposed to the economic course of Europe in prolonged recession. Leading clubs (e.g. Bayern 
Munich, Real Madrid, Barcelona, etc.) resist vigorously in economic terms, presenting economic 
growth on the revenue side. The millions of supporters and simultaneously "sponsors" of the top 
teams in the world, ensure forever the continuous increase in revenues. At the same time, these 
groups have large financial exposures due to expensive transfers, large contracts, etc. It is clear 
that the robust financial clubs (Real Madrid, Manchester United, Barcelona, Bayern Munich and 
so on) have been investing in academies, stadiums and training centers. 
Indeed, the club's tactics, especially the very powerful ones, were, is and will be to invest most 
of their capital in expensive transfers for commercial and competitive reasons. At the same time, 
the smaller clubs in this direction have been moving in order to be able to participate in European 
revenue-generating competitions, which are often able to "save" small clubs from bankruptcy.  
UEFA does indeed help the participating clubs in their economic growth by offering extra cash 
bonuses. For this reason, the Champions League is considered and is the largest inter-club 
European event.  
But the TV distribution system favors the rich championships of Europe (England, Spain, 
Germany, Italy, France), whose teams receive much more money than the rest. Something 
logical, as they are much more developed, but unequal, as the already wealthy clubs become 
much richer. As far as the money bonuses are concerned, they are almost entirely back in already 
robust financial groups. So here, the smaller clubs are "stingy". Finally, in the field of tickets, it is 
obvious that both the price and the completeness of the stadiums are much larger in first-class 
clubs than in the second and third ones. In conclusion, though, there is financial help from UEFA 
but it does not favor closing the gap between clubs.  
Regarding to the research, it has been observed that under the imposition of this regulation, 
the clubs in our sample exhibit remarkable changes to the best, apart from few cases. 
Particularly, most clubs have increased their profitability and reduced expenses and loans, 
improving simultaneously their financial ratios. Cases such as Milan, which has been damaging, 
have at least managed to reduce them. About Manchester, it is known that excessive and 
unnecessary sums have been invested in transfers, that’s why we have this result there, 
something that happened with Pari Saint Germain, but there, the signs started to become 
positive. Let us hope in the future, this situation to be continued and spread to every corner of 
Europe in order to have a healthy and purely competitive football that will attract even more 
fans. 
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